Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to trace partisan differences among Swedish governments during the period 1958-2000. According to the Partisan Theory of macroeconomic policy left-wing governments are relatively more concerned with the performance of the real side of the economy (real output and unemployment) as compared to right-wing governments, that place a higher weight on the nominal variables (inflation). Left-wing governments would therefore pursue more expansionary aggregate demand policy, and thereby be willing to risk a higher inflation, in order to improve real economic performance. In this paper we apply the model developed in Hibbs (1994) on Swedish data. Our empirical results support the partisan theory, showing that, ceteris paribus, aggregate demand policy under left-wing governments is relatively more expansionary than under right-wing governments, even if the expansionary policy sometimes leads to higher inflation.
Introduction
A whole new field of economics opened up once Nordhaus (1975) wrote "The Political Business Cycle". The central assumptions of the Nordhaus model is that voters are myopic and that party policies are not determined by partisan differences. Rather, a governing party capitalizes on voters' myopia and runs the economic policy in a way that will maximize the probability of being re-elected. Consequently as an election nears the economy should be characterized by increasing growth and falling inflation, while having the opposite effect in periods immediately following the election. Therefore, the pure existence of elections generate economic fluctuations. In opposition to this view, Hibbs (1977) presents a model in which parties also behave "ideologically". Winning elections is important, but only to the degree that it enables the party to implement policies favoring their core constituencies. This contrasting theory is called the Partisan Theory.
The foundation of the Partisan Theory (PT) of macroeconomic policy lies in the stylized fact that parties are made up of different core constituencies.
The differences in preferences among these constituencies are based heavily on distributional consequences of changes in inflation and unemployment. Generally, supporters of left-wing parties are less endowed with financial capital. Therefore they rely heavily on labor income. This makes the income of left-wing voters uncertain in periods of high unemployment. Right-wing voters, on the other hand, often possess financial capital, which makes them primarily interested in keeping the inflation down. Consequently, the leftwing party is, at least marginally, more interested in high growth (leading to high employment) while the right-wing party focuses primarily on keeping the inflation rate down. In the early models of political business cycles it was assumed that the economy worked along an almost stable Phillips curve in the inflation-unemployment space, and that politicians could pick a point along the curve that was consistent with the preferences of their core constituencies.
The Rational Partisan Theory (RPT) was developed by Chappell and Keetch (1986, 1988) and by Alesina and Sachs (1988) as a revision of the original PT to fit into the framework of rational expectations (RE). The original PT model was based on adaptive expectations, which allowed a backward sloping long-run Phillips curve (LRPC). In the RE paradigm, the LRPC is vertical. All attempts to increase aggregate demand by increasing government spending result in increased inflation. Chappell and Keech (1986) tested the RPT by applying ideas of long-term wage contracts. They found that in a model with fixed and known party objectives, the presence of longterm unindexed nominal wage contracts with the contract period crossing an election, partisan influence on inflation and unemployment is possible due to uncertainty of the outcome of the election.
The empirical evidence that partisan effects exist on growth (and unemployment) and inflation is quite unanimous. Generally, partisan models outperform Nordhaus' political business cycle as an explanation for observed pattern of growth, unemployment and inflation over administration periods. 1 Drazen (2000b) reviews the empirical studies of the Nordhaus model and concludes that the existence of an opportunistic PBC is generally rejected by U.S. data. This result carries over to data from developed economies outside the United States.
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Tests of the partisan theory, performed by Hibbs (1977 Hibbs ( , 1987 using U.S. post-war data on unemployment, growth, fiscal and monetary policy show strong support for the partisan theory. Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) present calculations indicating that average real GDP growth during Democrat administrations from 1949-1994 was 4.2%. The same measure during Republican presidencies was 2.4%. The average inflation rate during the same period was 3.8% and 4.2% for Democrats and Republicans, respectively.
